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National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Who Am I? 
 Ryan Lee 
 Senior Project Engineer – ESCG/Barrios 
Tech. 
 Constellation Space Suit Element 
 Pressure Garment Subsystem 
 Education 
 M.S. Aerospace Engineering 
– Space Human Factors Curriculum 
 7 years of advanced space suit design 
experience 
 2 years of EMU training experience 
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My Daughter: Liberty 
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Why Am I Here? 
 The Constellation Pressure Garment 
Subsystem (PGS) team performed a study 
to determine what the drivers would be for 
selecting an operating pressure in a space 
suit that meets Constellation requirements 
 Presentation Goals 
 Review Study Objectives 
 Examine the Pressure Selection Problem 
 Review Historical Suit Pressure Selection 
 Present Recommendations Based on Study 
Results 
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Study Objectives 
 Bound The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Understand Historical PGS Pressure 
Selection Rationale 
 Determine the Effects of Pressure 
Selection on PGS Design 
 Recommend Operational Pressure 
Paradigm for CSSE PGS 
 Contingency and Nominal Suit pressures 
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The 
Pressure 
Selection 
Problem 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 The pulmonary system is a pressure driven system 
 The human body needs external pressure roughly equal 
to the pressure of inspired gases for physiological 
processes to work efficiently 
 Pressurization with breathing gas makes sense 
 In a pressure vessel the wall stress (σ) is directly 
proportional to the internal vessel pressure (p): 
                                σ α p 
 Increased wall stress means increased wall 
stiffness 
 The stiffer the walls of a pressure vessel 
the more difficult it is to flex 
 Low pressure is more desirable for greater mobility 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Question: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Lower bound of design space, highest suit mobility 
 
How Low 
Can You 
Go? 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Sea level atmosphere is a mix of O2 and N2 at 
14.7 psi 
 21% is O2 so PPO2 is 3.1 psi 
 In healthy, non-smoking people arterial blood is 
almost completely saturated with O2 at sea level 
 Doctors don’t recommend supplemental oxygen 
until blood saturation levels are lower than 90% 
 Hypoxic conditions begin to manifest 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Blood Oxygen Dissociation Curve (PPO2 vs. 
Blood O2 Saturation) 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 90% Blood O2 saturation at 2.1 psi (10,000 ft.) 
 Represents lower bound of design space 
 US EVAs currently performed at 4.3 psi 
 Apollo EVAs performed at 3.7 psi 
 Lowest ppO2 allowed on ISS is 2.42 psi 
 During 10.2 psi airlock operations 
 Recommended atmosphere for lunar ops is 8.0 
psi w/ 32% O2 
 ppO2 = 2.56 psi 
 2.5 psi is ppO2 at 5500 ft. (Denver, Colorado) 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
Top of Mt. Yale - Colorado 
Altitude: 14,196 ft         Atmospheric Pressure: 8.3 psi        ppO2: 1.7 psi 
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 Orion/Lunar spacecraft will operate with a mixed 
oxygen/nitrogen environment 
 Both gasses will be dissolved in blood 
 A decrease in pressure will cause a decrease in the 
concentration of nitrogen dissolved in the blood 
 Excess gas normally expired through lungs 
 If pressure difference is great enough some excess 
gas will remain in body tissues and organs  
 Symptoms range from light pain, to impaired 
judgment, and even death 
 This condition is called Decompression Sickness 
(DCS) 
The Pressure Selection Problem 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Common way to track risk of DCS is by the ratio 
of body N2 to final absolute suit pressure  
 
 
 
 
 Higher R-Value = Greater Risk  
 Research has demonstrated a 5% risk of minor 
DCS symptoms in 1-g environment at R=1.4 
 U.S. EVAs performed at R~1.6 
 Russian EVAs performed at R~1.8 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Depressing from Sea Level (14.7 psi) 
 Highest Constellation vehicle pressure condition 
 Atmospheric PPN2 = 11.6 psi 
PPN2 Body 
(Psi) 
PSuit 
(Psi) 
R-value 
1g Risk of 
Minor 
Symptoms 
11.6 11.6 1 None 
11.6 9.7 1.2 <2% 
11.6 8.3 1.4 ~5% 
11.6 7.3 1.6 ~20% 
11.6 6.4 1.8 ~45% 
11.6 4.3 2.7 Huge 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Upper design space boundary depends on 
acceptable risk 
 R=1.4 to 1.6 (suit pressure 7.3 psi - 8.3 psi) 
PPN2 Body 
(Psi) 
PSuit 
(Psi) 
R-value 
1g Risk of 
Minor 
Symptoms 
11.6 11.6 1 None 
11.6 9.7 1.2 <2% 
11.6 8.3 1.4 ~5% 
11.6 7.3 1.6 ~20% 
11.6 6.4 1.8 ~45% 
11.6 4.3 2.7 Huge 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Risk of DCS controlled by: 
 O2 Pre-Breathe to Reduce PPN2 
 Higher Initial R-value Means Longer Pre-Breathe 
 Reducing Cabin PPN2 Prior to EVA 
 Reduced Overall Pressure, Higher PPO2 
 Increase Suit Pressure 
 Suit performance decreases with suit pressure 
increase 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 PPN2 is reduced by breathing O2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After 4 hours PPN2 ~ 7.0 psi 
 R-value for U.S. EVA = 7.0/4.3 = 1.63 
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Solving the Pressure Problem: 
                   APOLLO 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Apollo 
 Apollo spacecraft operated with a pure oxygen cabin 
pressure of 5.0 psi 
 Pure oxygen cabin meant no prebreathe required 
 Maximizing mobility was prime concern while minimizing 
risk of hypoxia 
 3.1 psi was the starting minimum operational pressure 
 Accounting for purge pressure drops, potential hardware 
failures, and emergency operations, the actual minimum 
nominal operating pressure was increased to 3.5 psi 
 Accounting for the regulator error band, the final 
operating pressure for the Apollo spacesuit  
was 3.75  0.25 psi 
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Solving the Pressure Problem: 
SHUTTLE 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 Decision was made to operate the Space Shuttle 
at sea-level pressure to account for future Space 
Station 
 For zero prebreathe, an 8.3 psi suit was 
recommended in 1973 (R=1.4) 
 NASA had no experience beyond Apollo suit 
pressure and considered an 8.3 psi program too 
expensive 
 Shuttle program conceded to a minor pressure 
increase to 4.1  0.1 psi  
 Because of the large pressure difference 
between cabin N2 and suit pressure, pure 
oxygen prebreathe would be required 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 Efforts to devise a means of prebreathe without 
the possibility of breaking protocol failed 
 In 1980 NASA attempted to eliminate prebreathe 
with a procedure to decrease the spacecraft 
cabin pressure to 9.0 psi, 12 hours before EVA 
 This decision required increasing the maximum 
allowable R-value to 1.6 (~20% risk of minor 
DCS symptoms) 
 9.0 psi was rejected because it would require a 
maximum 30% O2 in the Shuttle cabin and it was 
only certified to 25.9% 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 Astronaut Joe Kerwin, M.D. recommended 
decreasing the cabin pressure to 10.4 psi 
for 12 hours prior to EVA, and raising the 
EMU operational pressure to 4.3 psi 
 His method produced an R-value of 1.78, 
which he tried to justify as safe based on 
DCS risk calculations using alveolar gas 
rather than expired gas concentrations 
 This method was ultimately rejected 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 In parallel, Hamilton Sundstrand engineers 
suggested reducing cabin pressure to 11.8 psi 
for 12 hours and increasing suit operational 
pressure to 5.8 psi 
 This method would maintain an R-value of 1.6 
and require no prebreathe 
 An operational pressure increase to 5.8 psi 
would have required significant modifications to 
the EMU currently under production as a 4.1 psi 
suit 
 Method was rejected for cost reasons 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 In 1981 a JSC team suggested a hybrid approach of 
using both prebreathe and pressure manipulation 
 The method required: 
 One hour of pure oxygen prebreathe prior to cabin depress 
 Cabin pressure would be reduced to 10.2 psi for 12 hours 
 40 minutes of in-suit prebreathe prior to airlock depress 
 EMU operating pressure would be increased to 4.3 psi 
 Using an R-value of 1.6 
 Method was accepted but not certified to use until 1984 
 3.5 hour in-suit prebreathe was used prior to method 
certification 
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U.S. Pressure Selection – Shuttle 
 With the new prebreathe protocol (R-value of 1.6), 
models/testing predicted a 5% chance of serious DCS 
symptoms 
 DCS treatment was now a consideration 
 EMU had been certified to a proof pressure equal to 1.5 
times the max operating pressure of 5.3 psi (maximum 
PPRV pressure), or 8.0 psi, without structural damage 
 Bends Treatment Adapter (BTA) was developed that 
increased positive pressure relief to 8.8 psi max 
 Procedure written to use suit as hyperbaric chamber for 
DCS treatment at 6.0 and 8.0 psi  
 Suit taken to 8.0 psi cannot be reused until it has 
undergone an engineering evaluation 
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Solving the Pressure Problem: 
ORLAN 
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Russian Pressure Selection - Orlan 
 Russian spacecraft have always operated at 14.7 psi 
 Orlan pressure was chosen to minimize prebreathe 
 Russian DCS testing was performed using subjects 
wearing space suits (U.S. testing was done in shirtsleeve 
environment) 
 Tests resulted in an acceptable (~20% risk of minor DCS 
symptoms) R-value of 1.8 
 A zero prebreathe suit with an R-value of 1.8 results in 
an operating pressure of: 11.6 psi / 1.8 = 6.4 psi 
 30 minutes of oxygen prebreathe prior to 
airlock depress was added 
 Resulted in Orlan operating pressure 
of 5.8 psi 
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Solving the Pressure Problem: 
CONSTELLATION 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 NASA Exploration Atmospheres Working 
Group Final Report Recommendations  
Mission 
Phase 
Nominal 
Cabin 
(psi) 
Oxygen 
Concentration 
(%) 
PPO2 
(psi) 
PPN2 
(psi) 
Launch/ISS 14.7 21 3.1 11.6 
Lunar Coast 10.2 26.5 2.7 7.5 
Lunar Surface 8.0 32 2.6 5.4 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Four Nominal Pressure Options Examined 
 Option 1: Minimum Operating Pressure – 2.5 psi 
 Maximize Suit Operating Characteristics 
 Option 2: Sea Level O2 Operating Pressure – 3.5 psi 
 Reduces Risk Associate with Option 1 
 Apollo History – Lessons Learned 
 Option 3: Zero Pre-Breathe Operating Pressure 
 Eliminate Pre-Breathe Operational Overhead 
 Would operate at a different pressures for each environment  
 Option 4: Minimal Pre-Breathe Operating Pressure 
 20 minute pre-breathe 
 Minimal Overhead, Increased Suit Operability 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 For Nominal Operations: 
Pressure Option 
Ambient 
Spacecraft 
Pressure (psi) 
Nominal Operating 
Pressure (psi) 
Prebreathe Time 
Required 
Minimum O2 
14.7 
10.2 
8.0 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
> 9 hrs to R=1.6 
5.5 hrs to R=1.6 
4.5 hrs to R=1.3* 
Sea Level O2 
14.7 
10.2 
8.0 
3.5 
3.5 
3.5 
> 6 hrs to R=1.6 
2.5 hrs to R=1.6 
1.8 hrs to R=1.3* 
No Pre-Breathe 
14.7 
10.2 
8.0 
7.3 
4.7 
4.2 
0 min to R=1.6 
0 min to R=1.6 
0 min to R=1.3* 
Min Pre-Breathe 
14.7 
10.2 
8.0 
6.9 
4.5 
4.0 
20 min to R=1.6 
20 min to R=1.6 
20 min to R=1.3* 
* For Lunar EVA operations an R-value of 1.3 was recommended by the 
NASA Exploration Atmospheric Working Group 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Eliminated options 1 and 2: 
 Excessive prebreathe (greater than 40 minutes) 
 Eliminated option 3: 
 Recognized advantages to allowing a small 
amount of prebreathe 
 EVA prep will likely always require some steps 
while pressurized 
 Recognized EVA from 14.7 psi not required 
 ISS missions will perform EVAs from ISS A/L 
 Non-ISS missions will reduce cabin to 10.2 psi for 
a minimum of 36 hours prior to 0-g EVA 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 For Nominal Operations: 
Pressure Option 
Ambient Spacecraft 
Pressure (psi) 
Nominal Operating 
Pressure (psi) 
Prebreathe Time 
Required 
Min Pre-Breathe 
10.2 
8.0 
4.5 
4.0 
20 min to R=1.6 
20 min to R=1.3* 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Contingency operations – DCS Treatment: 
 EMU program uses an in-suit treatment 
pressure equivalent to suit ‘proof’ pressure 
 8 psi, or 1.5 x max operating (relief valve) pressure 
(5.3 psi) 
 EMU is no-go for EVA prior to an engineering 
evaluation 
 ‘Structural’ pressure (1.5 x Nominal operating 
pressure: 6.6 psi) is used to check suit 
integrity after build up prior to flight 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
σ 
ε 
Nominal Ops (4.3 psi) 
Max Nom/PPRV (5.3 psi) 
Structural = 1.5 x Nom (6.6 psi) 
Proof = 1.5 x Max (8.0 psi) 
Ultimate = 2.0 x Max (10.6 psi) 
 At Issue are loads in the hoop direction 
 Hoop stress is twice the plug load 
 The only restraint in the hoop direction is the base 
restraint fabric 
Design Factors of Safety 
2.0 x max against ultimate 
1.5 x max against yield 
Yield 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Requirements guarantee no structural damage at 
proof pressure 
 Beyond that there is no guarantee that 
permanent damage has not occurred 
 For CSSE lunar case, engineering evaluation will 
not be possible 
 Max DCS treatment pressure should not exceed 
suit ‘structural’ pressure 
 Structural pressure should be greater than 6.0 
psi (First Shuttle treatment pressure) 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 Contingency Operations – Rapid Cabin 
Depress: 
 Worst case instantaneous cabin 
decompression would be from 14.7 psi 
 NASA flight surgeons state that 8 psi is the 
minimum emergency prebreathe pressure for 
cabin depress from 14.7 psi 
 Design driving: Suit must have a minimum proof 
pressure of 8.0 psi 
 This scenario would be mission ending, a one 
time use of the suit at 8.0 psi for this case 
would be acceptable 
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The Pressure Selection Problem 
 For contingency operations: 
Pressure 
Option 
Ambient 
Spacecraft 
Pressure 
(psi) 
Nominal 
Operating 
Pressure 
(psi) 
Structural/
Max DCS 
Treatment 
Pressure 
(1.5 x Nom) 
Max 
Operational 
Pressure* 
(PPRV Set) 
(psi) 
Proof/Max 
Emergency 
Prebreathe 
Pressure 
(1.5 x Max) 
Min Pre-
Breathe 
10.2 
8.0 
4.5 
4.0 
6.8 
6.0 
5.5 
5.0 
8.25 
7.5 
*Assumed Nominal Operating Pressure + 1.0 psi 
 Minimum 4.3 psi required for 8.0 psi proof pressure 
 Reduced Pressure Selection Design Space: 
 4.5 psi for 0-g EVA with 20 minute prebreathe  
 4.3 psi to meet contingency 8.0 psi case 
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PGS Team Recommendation 
 Minimum single pressure paradigm that 
meets 8.0 psi emergency prebreathe 
pressure: 
 
 
 
 
 Selection of Single Pressure 
 Raises 0-g EVA prebreathe time to 40 min  
 0-g EVA currently not a nominal CSSE task 
Pressure 
Option 
Ambient 
Spacecraft 
Pressure 
(psi) 
Nominal 
Operating 
Pressure (psi) 
Structural/Max 
DCS Treatment 
Pressure (1.5 x 
Nom) 
Max 
Operational 
Pressure 
(PPRV Set) 
(psi) 
Proof/Max 
Emergency 
Prebreathe 
Pressure 
(1.5 x Max) 
Prebreathe Time 
Required 
Single 
Pressure 
10.2 
8.0 
8.0 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
6.6 
6.6 
6.6 
5.3 
5.3 
5.3 
8.0 
8.0 
8.0 
40 min to R=1.6 
0 min to R=1.27 
20 min to R=1.23 
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CSSE PGS Loading Considerations 
 Pressure Selection will also affect PGS 
design loads 
 PGS loading includes two types of loads 
 Pressure induced, or ‘plug’ loads 
 Man induced, or ‘man’ loads 
 Plug load 
 Based on suit geometry 
 Loads are easily predicted 
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CSSE PGS Loading Considerations 
 Man loading occurs both internal and external 
to the suit 
 Internal loads are called ‘isometric’ loads 
 EMU is certified to an isometric man load 
equivalent to 95th percentile isometric strength 
with a specified negative sizing delta  
 External loads are also referred to as 
‘satellite’ man loads 
 Satellite/man loads are a product of reacting large 
mass inertial loads while restrained in a foot 
restraint 
 Currently, satellite/man loads do not apply to the  
CSSE operational paradigm 
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CSSE PGS Loading Considerations 
 Sample EMU Load Limits (Taken from EMU S/AD) 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Plug Load 
(lb) 
Max Man Load 
(lb)* 
Load Limit (lb) 
Upper Arm Axial – 
Per Restraint Line 
4.3 122 163** 285 
8.0 227 45 272 
Lower Arm Axial – 
Per Restraint Line 
4.3 55 163** 218 
8.0 103 45 148 
Waist Axial – Per 
Restraint Line 
4.3 394 507** 901 
8.0 735 158 893 
Leg Outboard Axial – per 
Restraint Line 
4.3 104 470** 574 
8.0 189 79 268 
*Max man load at 8.0 psi is for an inactive crewmember at max BTA 
**Max man load is satellite/man load 
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CSSE PGS Loading Considerations 
 Load Limit Comparison Using Isometric Man Loads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   * Isometric loads taken from EMU S/ADs 
Pressure 
(psig) 
Plug 
Load (lb) 
Isometric 
Man Load 
(lb)* 
Load Limit 
(lb) 
EMU Load 
Limit (lb) 
Upper Arm Axial – 
Per Restraint Line 
4.3 122 134 256 
285 6.6 187 134 321 
8.0 227 134 361 
Lower Arm Axial – 
Per Restraint Line 
4.3 55 134 189 
218 6.6 84 134 218 
8.0 103 134 237 
Waist Axial – Per 
Restraint Line 
4.3 394 351 745 
901 6.6 605 351 956 
8.0 735 351 1086 
Leg – per Restraint 
Line 
4.3 102 240 342 
574 6.6 157 240 397 
8.0 189 240 429 
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CSSE PGS Loading Considerations 
 Pressure selection also effects operational life  
 Ops Con will dictate the operational life limits of 
the PGS  
 Certified EMU Operational Life: 
Time 
(Yrs.) 
Pressurized 
 Hours at  
4.3 psig 
Pressure  
Cycles at  
4.3 psig 
Pressure  
Cycles at 
5.3 psig 
Pressure  
Cycles at  
6.6 psig 
Hard Upper Torso – 
(Fiberglass) 
15 458 194 74 32 
Arm Assembly –  10 458 194 74 32 
Gloves –  8 229 97 37 16 
Lower Torso Assembly –  10 458 194 74 32 
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Summary 
 Nominal PGS pressure selection range: 
 Low End: 4.3 psi 
 Physiologically ~2.5 psi is low end 
 For 20 minute lunar prebreathe 4.0 psi is low end 
 4.3 psi driven by 8.0 psi emergency prebreathe requirement 
 High End: 4.5 psi 
 Considering 20 minute prebreathe from 10.2 psi cabin 
 For zero prebreathe from 10.2 psi cabin 4.7 is high end 
 Assumes no EVA from 14.7 psi 
 For nominal operations 4.3 psi chosen 
 Optimal suit usability characteristics 
 Zero lunar prebreathe, 40 min 0-g prebreathe 
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Summary 
 For contingency operations: 
 6.6 psi maximum for DCS treatment 
 Equivalent to suit ‘structural’ pressure 
 Can continue nominal operation after treatment w/o 
engineering evaluation 
 May require reduced man load certification (equivalent to 
EMU incapacitated crewmember load)  
 8.0 psi minimum for emergency prebreathe 
 For instantaneous cabin depress from 14.7 psi 
 May require reduced man load certification 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Summary 
 Loading Considerations: 
 Isometric loads will be a major driving force in the 
PGS Design 
 Satellite man loads will not apply 
 Need to determine if any other external loading does apply 
 If full isometric loads must be considered at 
contingency pressures the design load limit will be 
higher than current satellite man loads in many cases 
 Reduced man load schemes need to be considered 
for contingency operations 
 
 

